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The State of Mental Health Care in Post-Katrina
New Orleans
"Laws that are ambiguous prevent agencies from acting rapidly
and decisively in an emergency."'
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I. INTRODUCTION

Hurricane Katrina devastated every aspect of life in New
Orleans-notably, health care. While all fields of health care
remain in crisis more than two years after the storm, particularly
startling is the crippled state of mental health care in New Orleans.
The problem with recovery of the mental health care system in
New Orleans presents itself in three prongs: (1) the surge of mental
illness resulting from the devastation; (2) the delay in acquiring
health insurance following the storm; and (3) the general
breakdown of the New Orleans mental health care infrastructure.
In addition to the listed hurdles, any attempt to remedy the problem
has been marked by incongruity among the state, federal, and local
Copyright 2009, by HEATHER D'ANToNIo.
1. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers
Act: Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring
Infectious Diseases, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 622, 624 (2002).
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governments and entities. Before and after Katrina, this
incongruity manifested itself in an overwhelming bureaucracy in
Louisiana's health care system and has created a culture of
reactivity and shortsightedness in all areas of health care, including
mental health care.
This problem demonstrates the need to streamline the
administration of mental health care in a manner that can address
all possible issues concerning mental health, rather than force
disjointed agencies to manage with a fragmented set of statutes and
regulations. In discussing the need for such a comprehensive,
direct law, a medical scholar stated, "Laws that are ambiguous
prevent agencies from acting rapidly and decisively in an
emergency.",2 The Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act
(LHEPA),3 which has adapted provisions of the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA),4 seems like a plausible
prototype for such a project, as it addresses response to medical
emergencies. However, the LHEPA and the MSEHPA primarily
focus on health emergencies resulting from biological terrorism,
which is not the concern of this Comment. 5 Instead, Louisiana and
New Orleans are faced with a different type of terror-a mental
health pandemic. However, the LHEPA, with the supplementation
of various existing statutes and regulations, and the continued
supplementation of the MSEHPA, can be tailored to address the
current and future mental health care needs of the state.
This Comment will address the state of mental health care in
New Orleans before and after Katrina, with an emphasis on
weaknesses exacerbated by the storm. Part II of the Comment
addresses the overall state of health care before Katrina, focusing
2. Id.

3. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29:760-772 (2007).
4. The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act states that: "A 'public
health emergency' is an occurrence or imminent threat of illness or health
condition that.., is believed to be caused by... [a naturaldisaster] ... and poses
a high probability of any of the following harms: (i) a large number of deaths in
the affected population; (ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities in
the affected population; or (iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic
agent. .. ." MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH PowERs ACT § 104(m) (Revised
Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.
pdf. The brackets here were included by the drafters to imply that a state
legislature may include such a provision if applicable to its state.
5. The Preamble to the Model Act states that: "Though comprehensive, the
scope of the Act is limited in [that the] Act does not cover some distinct areas of
law despite their strong public health relevance. For example, the law relating to
mental health [and] alcohol and substance abuse . . . [is] not specifically
addressed." MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERs ACT pmbl. (Revised

Draft 2003).
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on the deficiencies in mental health care. The remainder of the
Comment illustrates specific issues in mental health care that have
arisen since the storm.
Part III discusses the rise in psychological illness since the
storm demonstrating the urgency for resolution of the problem.
Part IV addresses the difficulties in acquiring insurance
immediately following the storm and how these difficulties
contributed to the failing mental health of the New Orleans area
population. Part V describes the current failing condition of the
mental health infrastructure, with a comment on how Governor
Bobby Jindal plans to address the problem. Each section includes
background information specific to the issue; an explication of any
federal, state, or local response to the issue after the storm; and an
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the law affecting the
issue. Part VI proposes consolidating the law of mental health care
in order to more efficiently administer care. Specifically, Part VI
proposes streamlining a statutory response to mental health care
emergencies within the provisions of the LHEPA in a manner that
directly addresses the flaws that were exposed in the response to
Katrina. Finally, Part VII provides concluding thoughts on the
magnitude of this problem as well as general recommendations.
II. BACKGROUND: HEALTH CARE IN LOUISIANA AND NEW ORLEANS
BEFORE HURRICANE KATRINA

Hurricane Katrina amplified the flaws of an already failing
health care system.6 In 2004, the year before the storm, Louisiana
ranked fiftieth overall in the United Health Foundation's
assessment of the adequacy of state health care systems.7 One of
the factors that led to this ranking was the extremely low rate of
insurance coverage among Louisiana citizens, 8 which left about
20% of the population uninsured. 9 Medicare coverage apparently
accomplished little in ameliorating insurance problems; in 2003,
Louisiana was last in the national rankings for overall Medicare
quality, even though the state ranked first in overall Medicare
6. See Press Release, La. Dep't of Health & Hosps., State Health Rankings
Published: United Health Foundation Ranks Louisiana 50 (Nov. 8, 2004), http://www.
dhh.louisiana.gov/news.asp?ID=l&Detail=386&Arch=2004 [hereinafter Rankings
Release]. See also Deborah Gesensway, How a Legendary New OrleansHospitalIs
Strugglingto FinallyChange its Ways, INTERNIST (Am. College of Physicians), Apr.
1999, http://www.acponline.org/joumals/news/apr99/orleans.htm.
7. Rankings Release, supranote 6, at 50.
8. See Gesensway, supra note 6.
9.

John Pope, Blanco Demands Answers on Health Care; No Easy Solution

to I in 5 Uninsured,TIMEs-PICAYuNE (New Orleans), Dec. 17, 2004, at B 1.
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expenditure per capita.10 Governor Kathleen Blanco recognized the
lack of health insurance as the "core" of Louisiana's health care
problems. 11
While lack of insurance may be at the root of the problem, the
outward manifestation of Louisiana's health care problems has
been a culture of reactive medicine that developed throughout
Louisiana, creating a dependence on inpatient and emergency care
rather than less expensive outpatient and preventive care.'2
Particularly, there has been a dependence on the State's Charity
Hospital System, especially for the mentally ill. 13 However, in the
years before the storm, the efficiency of the Charity System fell
under scrutiny.14 First, the majority of patients who sought care in
the charity hospitals often had no insurance, rather than just
insufficient insurance. 15 As a result, the charity hospitals regularly
received no reimbursement for the expensive emergency care that
they provided from resources such as Medicare and Medicaid.' 6 As
Louisiana has been ranked among the highest in the nation in
emergency room visits, dependence on this emergency care created
a serious financial problem. 17 The dilapidated state of the Charity
Hospital System in New Orleans and the threats of removinF its
status as a level I trauma center evidenced this under-funding. In
an effort to improve the management of the hospitals, the
legislature transferred the authority of the Charity Hospital System
from the State to the Louisiana State University (LSU) System in
1997.19

10. Post Katrina Health Care: Continuing Concerns and Immediate Needs
in the New Orleans Region: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investment of H.R. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 10th Cong. 2 (2007)
(testimony of Frederick Cerise, Sec'y of La. Dept. of Health & Hosps.)
[hereinafter Cerise Testimony].
11. Pope, supra note 9.
12. Gesensway, supra note 6. See also Cerise Testimony, supranote 10.
13. Gesensway, supra note 6. See generally Russell McCulley, Another
Breakdown in New Orleans, TIME, May 15, 2007, http://www.time.com/time
/printout/0,8816,1621482, 00.html.
14. Gesensway, supranote 6.
15. Id; Cerise Testimony, supra note 10.
16. See Gesensway, supra note 6.
17. Cerise Testimony, supra note 10, at 2.
18. Patrick C. Breaux, Editorial, Health of Charity HospitalImportantto Us
All, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 1, 2005, at B6.
19. See Gesensway, supra note 6. The author cites that a motivation for this
transfer was to remove Louisiana politics from the equation. For a critique of
LSU's control of the Charity System, see Jan Moller, Senator Blasts Care at
CharityHospitals; He Says LSU System Neglecting Indigents, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), June 3, 2005, at A4.
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While there is a remedy to this funding problem, in reality it
only contributes to the culture of reactive health care in Louisiana
by perpetuating dependence on charity hospitals. The system is
called "disproportionate share hospital" funding (DSH) and is
Louisiana's means of paying for the health care of its uninsured.2 °
Under this mechanism, for every thirty cents that the state invests
in facilities like Charity Hospital New Orleans, the federal
government will "match" the dollar. Accordingly, for every three
dollars that the state invests, the federal government will invest
seven. The benefits of this program are potentially great, as about
$1.5 billion was allocated for Louisiana DSH funding in 2007.
However, Frederick Cerise, Secretary of the Louisiana Department
of Health and Hospitals (DHH), expressed his concerns about the
program to United States Congress. He critiqued the program for
only allowing DSH contributions for hospitals and not providing
for preventive, clinic-based services. So, this DSH mechanism
fosters the more expensive hospital-based care and therefore the
culture of reaction rather than prevention.21
In the months before Katrina, problems specific to mental
healthcare in Louisiana were also coming to the forefront. On July
1, 2005, about two months before the storm, Governor Blanco
convened a panel to discuss improving Louisiana health care. On
the topic of mental health, the panel noted that "nearly 900,000
Louisianans-about one person in five-suffer from a mental
disorder but there is no coherent state-run system for treating
them.
Specifically, several agencies had been charged with the
administration of mental health care, yet no clear division of
responsibilities existed among them. Furthermore, the agencies did
not communicate with each other in the provision of mental health
care. 2 3 Perhaps this unclear delegation of authority can be blamed
for a cut to mental health care funding one month before the storm.
When the DHH noticed an increase in the number of mentally ill
patients being treated at state facilities, it attributed the patient
increase to a lack of oversight. More specifically, the department
blamed the increase on failure to note patient improvement and to
encourage releases, the supposed result of insufficient and
20.
&

THE

STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN & JACK HADLEY, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID
UNINSURED, LOUISIANA'S PROPOSED SECTION 1115 MEDICAID

DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: ESTIMATING THE NUMBERS OF UNINSURED AND

PROJECTED MEDICAID COSTS 1 (2007), http://kff.org/uninsured/7669.cfm.

21. Cerise Testimony, supra note 10, at 3.
22. John Pope, State's Mental Health Programs Need to Be Integrated,

Panel Told Education Required to Raise Awareness, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New

Orleans), July 1, 2005, at A2.
23. Id.
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infrequent patient evaluations. For this reason, the Department cut
funding to the facilities.24
III. THE RISE IN MENTAL ILLNESS SINCE HURRICANE KATRINA
Since Hurricane Katrina, the incidence of psychological illness
has increased. Just after the storm, it was estimated that Hurricane
Katrina "[would] cause a 30 to 40 percent increase in the number
of Louisianans needing mental health treatment.. ,,,25 and it was
"estimated [that] 380,000 Louisianans [would] develop posttraumatic stress disorder." These predictions have proved to be an
underestimation. A recent study by the Department of Psychology
at the University of New Orleans has concluded 26that cases of
mental illness have actually doubled since the storm.
There are several factors contributing to this effect. Because of
evacuation and prolonged relocation, many mentally ill patients
did not have access to their physicians or their medication for an
extended period of time 27 and were separated from their needed
social support groups and families. 28 The relocation has also
greatly impacted the mental health of children residing both inside
and outside of the state. Aside from the general stress of surviving
the storm and relocating, the aftermath of Katrina has also put
pressure on schools throughout the nation to accommodate New
Orleans students. The resulting "cultural clashes" have placed
undue stress on many young children.29
24. Jan Moller, State Establishes New Rules for Mental Health Program:
Move Trims Costs; Improves Oversight, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July
29, 2005, at A2.
25.

LA. PUB. MENTAL HEALTH REVIEW COMM'N, PAY Now OR PAY LATER:

MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES HAVE NEVER BEEN MORE NEEDED (2006), http://

www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/publications/pubs-62/LPMHR%20COMMISSION
%201.pdf. This publication notes a disclaimer stating that it should be used for

informational purposes only.
26. HurricaneKatrina Victims' Mental Health Worsens (Nat'l Pub. Radio
broadcast Nov. 1, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 21542965 (summarizing
Weems, infra note 28).
27. LA. RECOVERY AuTH. SUPPORT FOUND., REPORT ON LOUISIANA
HEALTHCARE DELIVERY AND FINANCING SYSTEM 71 (Pricewaterhouse Coopers

2006), http://lra.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/searchable/reports/PwChealthcarereport
427061.pdf [hereinafter PWC REPORT]. This report notes that it is intended for the
use and benefit of the Louisiana Recovery Support Foundation only and not
intended for reliance by any other party.
28. See Carl F. Weems et al., The Psychosocial Impact of Hurricane
Katrina: Contextual Differences in PsychosocialSymptoms, Social Support, and
Discrimination,45 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 2295 (2007).
29. LA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HosPs., A ROADMAP FOR CHANGE: BRINGING
THE HOPE OF RECOVERY TO LOUISIANANS WITH MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS 52
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Concern about suicide since the storm also has increased.
Recent coroner records have shown that the suicide rate in post30
Katrina New Orleans is three times what it was before the storm.
However, the magnitude of the problem is unclear. One report
prepared for the Louisiana DHH has noted the possibility that the
true impact of Hurricane Katrina on the suicide rate of Louisianans
may never be known. 31 The report cites two reasons for this
proposition. First, there is an inclination of coroners to falsify the
cause of death when the cause is actually suicide in order to hide
the truth from the public. Second, after the prolonged relocation of
many citizens, it is has become difficult to maintain the records,
including causes of death, for Louisiana citizens outside of
Louisiana. 32 These factors lend to the possibility of gross
underestimation of true effects, especially once and if those
dispersed mentally ill return home. However, relying on the
coroner reports demonstrates the true urgency of the situation.
Additionally, in the aftermath of the storm, sociologists have
noted the cyclical phenomenon apparent in the social maladies of
33
homelessness, drug abuse, and psychological disorders.
Specifically, the mentally ill and the addicted, especially those who
cannot maintain employment, are prone to homelessness. The
despair of homelessness in turn often leads to substance abuse and
an increase in mental illness often for lack of treatment. This
creation or aggravation of mental illness then decreases the
probability of acquiring housing. Thus, homelessness is
perpetuated, creating a cycle.34
This trend casts a bleak shadow on the future of mental health
in New Orleans. It is possible that the increase in homelessness
since the hurricane will only lead to a further increase in mental
illness and fuel the aforementioned cycle.35 A realization of this
connection between mental illness, addiction, and homelessness
has prompted Senator Mary Landrieu to support the Gulf Coast

(June 2007), http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/publications.asp?ID=297&Detail=1326
&Arch=2006 [hereinafter ROADMAP FOR CHANGE]. This report was prepared by
groups in Virginia and Massachusetts.
30. Sen. Landrieu Chairs Hearing on Post-HurricaneMental Health, U.S.
FED. NEWS, Oct. 31, 2007, availableat 2007 WLNR 21625179 [hereinafter Sen.
Landrieu ChairsHearing].
31. RoADMAP FOR CHANGE, supra note 29, at 49.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 70-71. See also Mordecai Potash, Editorial, Psychiatristsand the
Homeless, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 6, 2007, at B6.
34. Id.
35. See id.
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Housing Recovery Act of 2007,36 which would provide for the
rebuilding of low-income housing destroyed in the flood.3 7 In her

justification of this legislation, the Senator summarized the nature of
the problem: "Housing is so critical ....
It's just not feasible to
stabilize [the mentally ill] when they're ... living on the street or in

a car." 38 For this reason, and because the incidence of mental illness
in the New Orleans area has the potential to continue increasing, the
need for a concerted effort to address the problem is evident.
39
IV. THE DIFFICULTY IN ACQUIRING INSURANCE AFTER THE STORM

One factor compounding the increase in psychological and
mental illness after Hurricane Katrina was the difficulty that
Louisianans, including those already mentally ill, encountered in
acquiring or maintaining insurance coverage. Several factors that
left many previously diagnosed mentally ill without needed
medication and healthcare arose immediately after the storm. The
population of New Orleans and much of Southeast Louisiana was
dispersed all over the nation without insurance cards and financial
records. 40 There was a problem even for those who were covered
by Medicaid and were in possession of their cards, as some states
would not accept out-of-state cards. 4 1 Another issue that surfaced
for Medicaid "insureds" was that individual states are allowed to
define their own Medicaid eligibility requirements and scope of
coverage.42 So, it was not uncommon for an evacuee's "host
36. S. 1668, 110th Cong. (2007).
37.

Sen. Landrieu ChairsHearing,supra note 30.

38. Id.
39. The issues surrounding insurance coverage in the aftermath of the
disaster are undoubtedly common to all insurance providers. However, this
Comment will narrow its scope to Medicaid for several reasons. First of all, the
Medicaid programs implemented after the storm are a primary example of the
federal and state response. Second, the actions involving Medicaid typify the
interrelation between federal and state systems in implementing a response plan.
Third, one of the goals of the Medicaid plans was to waive certain Medicaid
requirements, thus covering more people than would have been covered before
the storm. Last, because of the dramatic financial losses to much of the
Louisiana population as a result of the storm, the number of Louisiana citizens
eligible for Medicaid increased, even under non-waived requirements.
40. EVELYNE BAUMRUCKER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HURRICANE
KATRINA: MEDICAID ISSUES 2 (2005).

41. Id. at I0n.12.
42. Id. at 1. Several states have recommended a Medicaid Emergency
Response Plan to increase communication among the states in future disasters.
See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. & CTR. FOR MEDICAID
& STATE OPERATIONS, A SUMMARY OF STATE REPORTS FOR MEDICAID AND THE
STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH

INSURANCE

PROGRAM HURRICANE

KATRINA
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state 'A 3 to offer a range of coverage different from that available in
the evacuee's home state. 44 The Congressional Research Service
(CRS) summarized the nature of the problem in a hypothetical:
"For example, if a 16-year-old Medicaid recipient from Louisiana
relocates to Texas because of Hurricane Katrina and needs
inpatient psychiatric services, will he be able to obtain this care
given that the Texas Medicaid Program does not cover this benefit
while Louisiana's Medicaid program does? '45
A method of circumventing the disparities in Medicaid
requirements and regulations became obviously necessary,
particularly since the number of people eligible for Medicaid
increased after the storm with the massive loss of jobs, homes, and
property. 46 Immediately after Katrina's landfall, state and federal
governments began taking measures to ensure that victims of the
storm would receive necessary health care, namely through a
"waiver" that permitted dispensing of certain Medicaid
requirements in order to ease the acquisition of needed health
care. 47 While these actions seemed to be a massive movement
toward achieving this goal, the measures were rendered largely
ineffective due to lack of timeliness, short-sightedness in scope,
and over-regulation.
The first action was September 4, 2005, when the Secretary of
the United States Department of Health and Human Services

SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATIONS (2007), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidSt

WaivProgDemoPGI/downloads/Hurricane%20Katrina%2Final%20Summary/o
20Report.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY OF STATE REPORTS].
43. "Host-state" is the term used in the documentation to refer to the state to

which an evacuee relocated. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SPECIAL
TERMS AND CONDITIONS 5 (2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter SPECIAL
TERMS AND CONDITIONS].

44. BAUMRUCKER, supra note 40, at 6.
45. Id.
46. Id.at 2.
47. The Congressional Research Service looked immediately to New
York's response after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when all
Medicaid records were destroyed in the collapse of the World Trade Center.
This program was called Disaster Relief Medicaid. See Olson v. Wing, 281 F.
Supp. 2d 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). Similar to the Katrina situation, Medicaid
records were lost in the World Trade Center collapse. A class action initiated
suit for recovery of benefits that had been terminated after September 1 th. The
court ordered an injunction against stopping benefits while a fair hearing was
pending, "even though the state was unable to process any new applications." Id.
at 479. So, the federal government approved "presumptive eligibility" under 42
U.S.C § 1315. This presents a state dealing with a similar issue in a different
way. Perhaps this approach should be examined in Louisiana.
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(HHS) declared an "1135 waiver" for all Katrina states.4 8 This type
of waiver, available only to those "geographic areas directly
impacted by the emergency, '49 refers to Section 1135 of the Social
Security Act (SSA). This section of the SSA delineates a procedure
for waiver of certain Medicaid requirements that are imposed on
health care Rroviders, such as licensing, certification, and referral
procedures. Other requirements that were waived included "pre48. BAUMRUCKER, supra note 40, at 17.
49. Id.at 16.
50. Id.at 17. The Social Security Act states, in pertinent part:
(a) Purpose. The purpose of this section is to enable the Secretary to
ensure to the maximum extent feasible, in any emergency area and
during an emergency period (as defined in subsection (g)(1) of this
section)-(1) that sufficient health care items and services are available to meet
the needs of individuals in such area enrolled in the programs under
subchapters XVIII, XIX, and XXI of this chapter; and
(2) that health care providers (as defined in subsection (g)(2) of this
section) that furnish such items and services in good faith, but that are
unable to comply with one or more requirements described in
subsection (b) of this section, may be reimbursed for such items and
services and exempted from sanctions for such noncompliance, absent
any determination of fraud or abuse.
(b) Secretarial authority. To the extent necessary to accomplish the
purpose specified in subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary is
authorized, subject to the provisions of this section, to temporarily
waive or modify the application of, with respect to health care items
and services furnished by a health care provider (or classes of health
care providers) in any emergency area (or portion of such an area)
during any portion of an emergency period, the requirements of
subchapters XVIII, XIX, or XXI of this chapter, or any regulation
thereunder (and the requirements of this subchapter other than this
section, and regulations thereunder, insofar as they relate to subchapters
XVIII, XIX, or XXI), pertaining to(1)(A) conditions of participation or other certification requirements for
an individual health care provider or types of providers,
(B) program participation and similar requirements for an individual
health care provider or types of providers, and
(C) pre-approval requirements;
(2) requirements that physicians and other health care professionals be
licensed in the State in which they provide such services, if they have
equivalent licensing in another State and are not affirmatively excluded
from practice in that State or in any State a part of which is included in
the emergency area;
(3) actions under section 1395dd of this title (relating to examination
and treatment for emergency medical conditions and women in labor)
for(A) a transfer of an individual who has not been stabilized in violation
of subsection (c) of such section if the transfer is necessitated by the
circumstances of the declared emergency in the emergency area during
the emergency period; or
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approval requirements," in-state licenses, enrollment deadlines,
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA)
prohibitions on turning patients away (provided that such action is
in accordance with some emergency plan), and certain Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy
requirements, but only for the first seventy-two hours of the
emergency. 51 However, such requirements were waived
only to the extent necessary to ensure that sufficient health
care items and services are available to meet the needs of
individuals enrolled in Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP
[State Children's Health Insurance Programs] . . .and to
ensure that health care providers that furnish such items in

(B) the direction or relocation of an individual to receive medical
screening in an alternative location(i) pursuant to an appropriate State emergency preparedness plan; or
(ii) in the case of a public health emergency described in subsection
(g)(1)(B) of this section that involves a pandemic infectious disease,
pursuant to a State pandemic preparedness plan or a plan referred to in
clause (i), whichever is applicable in the State;
(4) sanctions under section 1395nn(g) of this title (relating to
limitations on physician referral);
(5) deadlines and timetables for performance of required activities,
except that such deadlines and timetables may only be modified, not
waived;
(6) limitations on payments under section 1395w-21(i) of this title for
health care items and services furnished to individuals enrolled in a
Medicare+Choice plan by health care professionals or facilities not
included under such plan; and
(7) sanctions and penalties that arise from noncompliance with the
following requirements (as promulgated under the authority of section
264(c) of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (42 U.S.C. 1320d-2)(A) section 164.510 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, relating
to(i) requirements to obtain a patient's agreement to speak with family
members or friends; and
(ii) the requirement to honor a request to opt out of the facility
directory;
(B) section 164.520 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, relating to
the requirement to distribute a notice; or
(C) section 164.522 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, relating
to(i) the patient's right to request privacy restrictions; and
(ii) the patient's right to request confidential communications.
42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(a)-(b) (Supp. V 2005).
51. BAUMRUCKER, supra note 40, at 16; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., HHS Declares Public Health Emergency for Hurricane Katrina
(Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.hhs.gov/katrina/ssawaiver.html.
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good faith, but are unable to comply with one or more of
these requirements as a result of Hurricane Katrina, may be
reimbursed for such items and services and exempted from
sanctions for such noncompliance.
Second, on November 10, 2005, a "1115 waiver" 52 was
awarded specifically to the Louisiana Medicaid Agency.53 This
included a proposal for a temporary eligibility allowance for
Medicaid and SCHIP to expire five months from the date of
application,54 the cost of which would be repaid to the state with
federal funding. 5 This proposal had serious shortcomings,
however-so serious that Louisiana opted not to implement the
plan. First, to qualify for this temporary eligibility, the person had
to have been an "evacuee." "Evacuee" was defined in the waiver as
"an individual who is a resident of the emergency area... and has
been displacedfrom his or her home by the emergency . . .and
meets the definition of eligible population... .,56 States other than
57
Louisiana were the primary recipients of the eligible "evacuees."
So, the waiver was inapplicable to Louisiana's in-state concerns as
it was available only to Louisiana citizens outside Louisiana. 5RIn
other words, the program proposed to waive Louisiana Medicaid
requirements when what the evacuees needed was a waiver of the

52. The Social Security Act states, in pertinent part:
In the case of any experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which,
in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the
objectives of subchapter I, X, XIV, XVI, or, XIX, or part A or D of
subchapter IV, in a State or States . . .the Secretary may waive
compliance with any of the requirements of section 302, 602, 654,
1202, 1352,1382, or 1396a..., as the case may be, to the extent and
for the period he finds necessary to enable such State or States to carry
out such project ....During the 6-month period ending 1 year before
the date the waiver under subsection (a) with respect to a waiver project
would otherwise expire, the chief executive officer of the state which is
operating the project may submit to the Secretary a written request for
an extension, of up to 3 years, of the project.
42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1), (e)(2) (2000).
53. SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 43, at 5; Letter from Mark
B. McLellan, Administrator, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to Jerry
Phillips, Acting Director, La. Medicaid Agency (Mar. 24, 2006) (on file with

author).

SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 43, at 4-5.
55. BAUMRUCKER, supra note 40, at 14.
56. SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 43, at 4 (emphasis added).

54.

57. Letter from Jerry Phillips, Director, La. Medicaid Agency, to Donna
Schmidt, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. & Ctr. for Medicaid & State
Operations (Dec. 29, 2006) (on file with author).
58. Id.See also SUMMARY OF STATE REPORTS, supra note 42.
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requirements of the state to which they relocated. 59 Also detracting
from the appeal of the waiver was the condition that Louisiana
must "track each evacuee" in order to maintain compliance and
minimize abuse 60 and a lack of timeliness; the 1115 waiver was not
granted until November 10, 2005,61 two months after the storm.
In addition to the proposed waivers, an Uncompensated Care
Pool (UCCP) 62 was initiated by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) to reimburse Louisiana health care
providers who cared for evacuees. 63 Aware of the immediate risk
to mentally ill patients who were not receiving care or medication,
CMS classified mental health clinic services and inpatient
psychiatric services as reimbursable under the plan.64 However,
this pool was highly regulated. To obtain this reimbursement, the
health care provider was required to ensure that the care was
"medically necessary" and that the patient had no other available
insurance coverage. The provider had to submit a detailed
65
description of each specific treatment performed on the patient.
The health care provider also was required to have been a
Medicaid provider as of four days before the storm, further
limiting the scope of the reimbursement plan. 66 Additionally, it
was stipulated that services rendered on and after 67February 1,
2006, were not considered eligible for reimbursement.
Perhaps most demonstrative of the kind of restrictions on the
use of the fund is the language of federal officials in
correspondence with state officials regarding the implementation
of the plan. The UCCP policymakers termed it "the payer of last
resort" in order to "ensure the integrity" of the fund. 6s In
correspondence, Mark McClellan, a HHS administrator, wrote to
the acting director of the Louisiana Medicaid Agency: "No
payments may be made under the UCCP for an item or service that
an evacuee or affected individual has received from an individual
or organization as part of a public or private hurricane relief
59. BAUMRUCKER, supra note 40, at 16.
60. Letter from Mark B. McClellan, Administrator, U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., to Ben Bearden, Director, La. Medicaid Agency (Nov. 10, 2005)
(on file with author).
61. Id.
62. Some sources have referred to this as UCC or UCP. See Letter from
Jerry Phillips to Donna Schmidt, supra note 57.
63. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID, LOUISIANA HuRRcANE RELIEF
UNCOMPENSATED CARE POOL PLAN 1 (2005) (on file with author).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
Id.at 6.
Letter from Mark McLellan to Jerry Phillips, supranote 53.
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effort., 69 While it is understandable that HHS sought to save this
money for legitimate claims and for those who were in need of it
the most, it seems counterproductive to the relief effort to have
precluded those who had obtained assistance from volunteers and
other relief workers from obtaining reimbursable care.
Aside from strict regulation, timeliness also was a problem in
implementing the UCCP Plan. The plan was proposed on
November 1, 2005,70 but was not approved by HHS until March
24, 2006. This left a little over two months following the storm
during which health care providers were totally unsure of the
prospect of reimbursement and another six months before they
knew whether the plan would be approved. As stated by the
Director of the Louisiana Medicaid Agency in correspondence on
the matter, "It would have been helpful if we could have received
timely CMS responses to our... questions ....This would have
provided clarification to the providers as well as the staff that
worked on this project
71 thus minimizing frustration and unnecessary
work on both sides."
Additionally, similar to the drafting of the Section 1115
waiver, the potential effectiveness of the UCCP was undercut by
its intended scope. First, as the 1115 waiver was available only to
Louisiana evacuees who were outside the state, the PCCF was
available only to Louisiana health care providers. The PCCF was
not available to out-of-state health care 7roviders who treated
otherwise ineligible Louisiana evacuees. In other words, no
action was taken for Louisianans in or returning to Louisiana.
Second, the UCCP was meant to exist for only six months. 73 These
factors show the short-sightedness of the response, especially with
regard to the mentally ill. The fact that the incidence of mental
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Letter from Jerry Phillips to Donna Schmidt, supra note 57.
72. Though the 1115 waiver did apply to the majority of Louisiana
evacuees, not all were eligible under the waiver. The waiver conditions stated
that, "[e]vacuee status will be limited to parents, pregnant women, children
under age 19, individuals with disabilities, low-income Medicare recipients, and
low-income individuals in need of long-term care ....Evacuee status can be
established by self-attestation of displacement [and] income . . . ." See U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MULTI-STATE SECTION 1115
DEMONSTRATION TEMPLATE, MEDICAID AND SCHIP COVERAGE FOR EVACUEES
OF HURRICANE KATRINA (2007) (on file with author). See also Letter from Mark
McClellan to Ben Bearden, supra note 60.
73. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF FEDERAL
PAYMENTS AVAILABLE FOR PROVIDING HEALTH CARE SERVICES TO HURRICANE
EVACUEES AND REBUILDING HEALTH CARE INFRASTRUCTURE (2006) (on file

with author).
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illness in New Orleans continues to increase more than three years
after 74the storm shows that mentally ill patients need long-term
care.

The shortcomings of the response with regard to insurance
aggravated the effects that the storm would have on the mental
health of New Orleans citizens. One survey revealed that about twothirds of the population lost insurance coverage as a result of the
storm. 75 This number is staggering. For a mentally ill patient who
could not access much needed medication or care as a result of the
delay or loss of insurance, the consequences were potentially severe.
As one psychologist has written, "there is evidence that delays in
treatment can lead to increased morbidity and mortality, including
the development of various [secondary] psychiatric and physical
[conditions] and the adoption of life-threatening and life-altering
self-treatments [such as] licit and illicit substance abuse ...,,76
V. THE CONDITION OF

THE MENTAL HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE IN

NEW ORLEANS

The condition of the New Orleans mental healthcare
infrastructure, namely its incapacity to treat its ill, is the byproduct
of the state of the health care system before the storm,
psychological stress resulting from the trauma of the disaster, as
well as aggravation resulting from a delay of care. These issues are
discussed in Parts II, III, and IV, respectively.
The primary challenge currently facing the mental health care
infrastructure in New Orleans is the lack of "beds"77 for psychiatric
patients. Before Katrina, most mental health patients sought care at
LSU Charity Hospital, commonly called "Charity," generally in
the emergency department. Charity had ninety-seven psychiatric
inpatient beds and provided care to about half of all mental health
or addiction patients in the New Orleans area. 78 However, Charity
74. See generally McCulley, supra note 13; John Pope, Poll: Mental Health
a Victim of the Storm, Half Report Having Recurring Problems, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 21, 2006, at 1; Potash, supra note 33; All Things
Considered. New Orleans Suffers Crisis in Mental Health Care (Nat'l Pub.
Radio broadcast Aug. 29, 2007) [hereinafter All Things Considered].
75. Pope, supranote 74.
76. Catherine G. McLaughlin, Delays in Treatmentfor Mental Disorders
and Health InsuranceCoverage, HEALTH SERVS. RES., Apr. 2004, at 221.

77. "Bed" is a term used in medical literature to denote an inpatient bed,
whether in a hospital or clinic. In other words, a "bed" is a place for the ill to go
when they cannot care for themselves, or be cared for at home. See MERRIAMWEBSTER MEDICAL DICTIONARY ONLINE (2008), http://medical. merriam-webster

.com/medical/bed.
78. PWC REPORT, supra note 27, at 70.
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was damaged in the storm and has not reopened. 79 Thus, Katrina
left the city without its primary institution for caring for the
mentally ill."8
The impact of the loss of Charity has been felt throughout the
New Orleans Metropolitan area, as well as throughout other parts
of the State. For example, Earl K. Long Charity Hospital in Baton
Rouge has experienced a doubling of mental health patients since
the storm.8 1 However, the tales of impact on the city of New
Orleans itself are much more gruesome. Mentally ill patients, some
severely ill, seek care at local emergency rooms only to find that
there is no space, no "beds" for them. To keep the severely ill from
roaming the street, some city officials have resorted to sending
patients to jail.82 But jail is not the appropriate place for the severely
mentally ill. One judge recounts the story of a schizophrenic man
who was taken to jail because there was no available "bed" at any
local hospital. Apparently confused about his surroundings, he
urinated on an inmate, and as a result, he was beaten83so badly that
a piece of his skull had to be removed from his brain.
The interest of the patient, though, must be weighed against the
interest of the public. A second harrowing account tells of another
schizophrenic man who was turned away from a hospital, only to
return home to stab his mother seventeen times. 84 One judge has
admitted that, to prevent such incidents, officials in the criminal
justice system have advised family members of the mentally ill to
falsely report that the patient has committed a crime so that he or

79. See McCulley, supra note 13.
80. The operational health care facilities as of June 2006 in the New
Orleans Metropolitan Human Services District were Chartres Pontchartrain
Mental Health Center and Central City Mental Health in New Orleans, St.
Bernard Mental Health Center in St. Bernard Parish, and Algiers Outreach
Clinic in Algiers. New Orleans Mental Health Center and Desire Florida Mental
Health Clinic were closed. In the Jefferson Parish Human Services Authority,
East Jefferson Mental Health Center in Metairie and West Jefferson Mental
Health Center in Marrero were open. In the Florida Parishes Human Services
Authority, Lurline Smith Mental Health Center in Mandeville and two other
facilities not in the general travel area from New Orleans were open.
Operational Louisiana Mental Hospitals were Central Louisiana State Hospital
in Pineville, Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System (with one location in
Greenwell Springs and two in Jackson), New Orleans Adolescent Hospital, and

Southeast Louisiana Hospital in Mandeville.

DEP'T OF HEALTH & HosPs.
OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES BLOCK

GRANT APPLICATION FIsCAL YEAR 2007, SECTION Two

81.
82.
83.
84.

PWC REPORT, supra note 27, at 70.
McCulley, supranote 13.
All Things Considered,supranote 74.
Id.

50-51 tbl. (2006).
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she may be arrested and receive the "care" of the criminal justice
system."
86
Other than the lack of beds,86 another crisis is the lack of
mental health care professionals in the New Orleans area,
particularly primary care providers. 87 One year after the storm,
only twenty-two of 196 psychiatrists had returned to the city.88 A
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report asserts that this is
the biggest problem facing New Orleans and that it can be
attributed to the insufficient amount of available and affordable
housing to accommodate the necessary health care workforce.
Furthermore, there is much competition from other sectors, with
newly comparable pay offers. For example, many fast-food chains
offered signing bonuses and dramatic wage increases in an effort to
reopen business in New Orleans. 89 Overall, the support staff
necessary to sustain an adequate mental health care infrastructure
has not returned to the healthcare workforce.
Compounding these problems, and perhaps posing the most
significant hurdle, is that so many varying agencies govern mental
health services in the New Orleans area. It is difficult to determine
the function and accountability, and thus the propriety, of each of
their responses to the problem." °
The federal, state, and local responses to the problem of
infrastructure have been varied. The federal government has
primarily responded to this concern with general funding. Under
the Stafford Act:

85. Id.
86. One remaining New Orleans area mental health care facility, the New
Orleans Adolescent Hospital, has fourteen mental health beds in Central City. In
response to the need for adult care, the facility also has opened another unit,
which it calls the New Orleans Adolescent Hospital Adult Acute Services. Here,
twenty adult psychiatric beds are available, but only for stabilization purposes.
So, at this facility, care for adults (18 and over) expires after two weeks. Health
Department: New Orleans Adolescent Hospital, http://www.cityofno.com/
Portals/Portal48/portal.aspx?portal=48&tabid=29 (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
See also Press Release, DHH Reopens New Orleans Psychiatric Hospital: Beds
at NOAH to Address Critical Mental Health Needs (Aug. 11, 2006), http://
www.dhh.louisiana.gov/news.asp?Detail--92 1.
87. Cerise Testimony, supra note 10, at 17.
88. Russell McCulley, Is New Orleans Having a Mental Health
Breakdown?, TIME, Aug. 1, 2006, http://www.time.con/time/printout/0,8816,
1221982,00.html.
89. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES-HURRICANE KATRINA: STATUS OF HOSPITAL INPATIENT AND
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS AREA (2006),

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06l003.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
90. ROADMAP FOR CHANGE, supra note 29, at 22.
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The President is authorized to provide professional
counseling services, including financial assistance to state
and local agencies or private mental health organizations to
provide such services or training of disaster workers, to
victims of major disasters in order to relieve mental health
problems caused or aggravated by such major disaster or its
aftermath. 91

91. 42 U.S.C. § 5183 (2000). The federal regulations promulgated in
accordance with this statute describe in detail how the federal government
should implement such a response:
Assistance; procedures, limitations.
(a) Application. In order to obtain assistance under this part, the
Governor or his State Coordinating Officer must, not later than 60 days
following a major disaster declaration by the President, file with the
appropriate Regional Director a request which includes:
(1) An estimate of the number of disaster victims who may need
professional mental health crisis counseling services and of the number
of disaster workers who may need training in the provision of such
services;
(2) Identification of the geographical areas in which the need exists;
(3) An estimate of the period during which assistance under this part
will be required and of the total funds which will be required to provide
such assistance;
(4) A description of the types of mental health problems caused or
aggravated by the major disaster or its aftermath; and
(5) Identification of the State and local agencies and private mental
health organizations capable of providing professional mental health
crisis counseling to disaster victims or training of disaster workers.
(b) Review, approval. The Secretary, upon notification by the
Administrator of a State request for assistance under this part, will
conduct a review to determine the extent to which such assistance is
needed to supplement assistance programs provided by State and local
governments and private organizations and, on the basis of that review,
prepare and submit a recommendation and report for consideration by
the Administrator. Upon approval by the Administrator and his
advancement of funds for carrying out the approved assistance, the
Secretary may, within the limits of the funds advanced, provide the
approved services either directly or through a grant or contract.
(c) Eligibilityfor services. In order to be eligible for the professional
mental health crisis counseling services available under this part an
individual must:
(i) Have been located within the designated major disaster area or have
been a resident of such area at the time of the major disaster or its
aftermath; and
(ii) Have a mental health problem which was caused or aggravated by
the major disaster or its aftermath.
(2) Disaster workers who are available on short notice to provide
professional mental health crisis counseling services in a major disaster
area are eligible for training under this part.
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In accordance with the Act, $2 billion was appropriated to the
Disaster Relief Fund after Katrina in H.R. 2360 in the Federal
Deficit Reduction Act. This sum was for the benefit of all Katrinaaffected states. 93 An account of this expenditure reports that it has
been appropriated to address stress management for public
workers, crisis intervention, and to provide funding for forty-five
beds for "behavioral health" for the Substance and Mental Health
Services Administration (SAMHSA).94 The federal government
also granted the Louisiana Department of Social Services $80
million to address mental health care concerns. The DHH, the
agency in charge of dispersing the funds, gave almost half the
amount to state emergency departments to deal with what is termed
"crisis intervention." A portion of the money has also been allotted
to addressing stress management for the public workers, to
increase the number of services for substance abuse addition and
to initiate the "Louisiana Spirit" mobile counseling service. 9 y The
DHH apportioned slightly less than 10% of the funds, $7 million,
to create housing for the mentally disabled; this most likely was
96
done to save psychiatric inpatient beds for critical patients.
However, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
acted as a filter for this funding, and it has been stated that the
agency "was too rigid in its rules 97
about how states and localities
can spend funds for mental health.,
The Louisiana response has been more specifically focused. On
the state executive level, Governor Blanco issued Executive Order
No. KBB 2005-16. In this order, the Governor called upon the
agencies to increase the availability and efficiency of mental health
care in the state. However, the only specific mandate of the order
was to reinforce that the Louisiana Department of Health and

(d) Time limitation. Contracts and grants awarded under this part will

not continue beyond 180 days after the first day services are provided
pursuant to such contracts and grants, except that upon the
recommendation of the Secretary (1) the Regional Director may extend
the 180 day period for up to 30 days or (2) the Administrator may
extend the 180 day period for more than 30 days.
42 C.F.R. § 38.3 (2007).
92. See KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL STAFFORD ACT
DISASTER ASSISTANCE: PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATIONS, ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES
AND FUNDING 20 (2005).

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Cerise Testimony, supra note 10, at 11.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 13.
See PWC REPORT, supra note 27.
Sen. Landrieu ChairsHearing,supra note 30.
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Hospitals was to be in charge of the mission. 98 Also, in accordance
with this grant of authority, the Louisiana DHH has enacted
regulations to address the overall situation in New Orleans and
statewide.
In February 2007, the DHH issued another rule seeking a
higher reimbursement rate for private hospitals caring for
psychiatric patients. 99 Also in February 2007, DHH issued a $15
million grant to the Greater New Orleans Health Services
Corporation (GNOHSCI designed to address the problems in the
health care workforce. 00 With this grant, the GNOHSC has
attempted to attract health care providers to the area by offering to
reimburse them for their relocation costs and to pay medical
malpractice insurance for those who pledge to work in New
Orleans for three years.' ° 1 In March 2007, DHH issued an
emergency rule 1° 2 to increase reimbursement fees' 0 3 for psychiatric
and behavioral screening. 10 4 Also, in March 2007, DHH proposed
a rule that would increase funding for facilities for the mentally
handicapped. 10 5 Later, in May 2007, the DHH issued another
emergency rule that would increase pay to directors of facilities for
the mentally handicapped. 106 Most recently, in July 2007, the DHH
also promulgated an emergency rule titled "moratorium on mental
health," which is conspicuously unavailable in the Louisiana
Register. 0 7 Overall, it is clear that in the past year, the DHH has
recognized that measures must be taken to address the need for
mental health facilities and mental health professionals.
Specifically, the DHH has recognized the need to create incentives
for institutions and professionals to make caring for the mentally ill
a priority.
98. Exec. Order No. KBB-2005-16, 31 La. Reg. 1443 (June 2005), available
at http://doa.louisiana.gov/osr/other/kbb05-16.htm. This action resulted in an
extensive Department of Health and Hospitals Report titled, The Louisiana Plan
for Access to Mental Health Care, released in 2007.
99. 33 La. Reg. 289 (Feb. 2007).
100.

Cerise Testimony, supra note 10, at 17.

101. Id.
102. An "emergency rule" is defined in the Louisiana Administrative
Procedure Act (LAPA) as a rule enacted "[i]f an agency finds that an imminent

peril to the public health safety or welfare requires adoption of a rule on shorter
notice than [typically required by the LAPA]." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
49:953(b)(1) (2003).
103. Reimbursement fees are the manner in which a facility is compensated
for providing low-cost or no-cost medical care. See Cerise Testimony, supra
note 10, at 17.
104. 33 La. Reg. 413 (Mar. 2007).

105. Id. at 461.
106.
107.

33 La. Reg. 781 (May 2007).
33 La. Reg. 1328 (July2007).

2009]

COMMENTS

681

The Louisiana Legislature has also taken its own measures,
primarily to address the future of mental health care as well as
overall health care in Louisiana. House Bill No. 846, which was
passed in June 2006, "[a]uthorize[d] temporary registration of

health care professionals during a declared state of public
emergency5l° in an effort to decrease the "red tape" that often
arises in an emergency situation and to expedite the placement of
needed health care professionals. This bill was codified in
Louisiana Revised Statute section 29:769(E). 109 More recently, the
Legislature also provided LSU and the Veterans' Administration
(VA) $74 million under the "Louisiana Recovery Authority Action

Plan" to build a hospital in downtown New Orleans.

Because an

108. H.B. 846, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2006). This bill passed June 2,
2006. See also CTR. FOR THE LAW & THE PUB.'S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN &
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT
STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY TABLE 8 (2006), available at http://www.

publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA%20Leg%2OActivity.pdf.
109. This provision, which is part of the Louisiana Emergency Health
Powers Act, reads:
Temporary registration of health care professionals.
Any board or commission placed within the Department of Health
and Hospitals by R.S. 36:259(E), (R), (EE), and (GG) may exercise
during such period as the declared state of public health emergency
exists, the power reasonably necessary to issue temporary
registrations to health care providers licensed, certified, or registered
in another jurisdiction of the United States whose licenses,
certifications, or registrations are current and unrestricted and in
good standing in such jurisdictions. The boards and commissions
may promulgate rules creating an expedited emergency process for
issuance of emergency temporary registrations. Such temporary
registrations may be granted for a period of not more than sixty days
at the discretion of the board or commission, with the possible
extension of up to two additional sixty-day periods as determined
appropriate and necessary by the board or commission. The
temporary registrants shall register with the respective board or
commission prior to providing professional services in this state.
Rules promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this Section may, at
the discretion of the board or commission, provide that the temporary
registrants shall only be allowed to provide gratuitous services
specified by the board or commission, or its designee for such
purpose. Within thirty days after June 2, 2006, each such board or
commission shall file an emergency plan with the department for
processes related to registration of health care providers licensed,
certified, or registered in another jurisdiction of the United States
responding to the public health emergency.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:769(E) (2007).
110. Press Release, La. State Univ. Health Care Servs. Div. of La.'s Hosp. Sys.,
Legislature Approves Hurricane Relief Funds for LSU Hospital Construction in
New Orleans (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.lsuhospitals.org/media-relations/Press
Releases/2007/LegeApprovesFunds-LSU-VA.pdf [hereinafter LSUHCS Release].
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estimated 50% of the city's population eventually will return,1 1 1
building more hospitals is a clear necessity.112
While planning for the future, however, the past of Louisiana
and New Orleans health care must also be examined. The
inevitable failure of the New Orleans mental health care
infrastructure can be traced to lack of foresight and lack of
substance and direction on the state level.
In the years just prior to Hurricane Katrina, action among the
executive and administrative spectra of Louisiana state government
evidences a move to remedy the already ailing health care system
in the state. In 2003, the legislature took a step in the right
direction by adopting portions of the Model State Emergency
Powers Act," 3 while modifying the language to fit Louisiana's
specific needs. 11 4 However, much like its federal counterpart, this
Act fails to anticipate a failure of the overall mental health care
infrastructure. Rather, this Act is included in the military chapter of
the revised statutes, showing once again that the drafters of the Act
did not contemplate what obviously was becoming imminent-that

111. PWC REPORT, supra note 27, at 5.
112. A temporary addiction facility opened in July for patients at least
eighteen years old. It has twenty beds at the LSU Interim Hospital. In the fall
of 2007, LSU will open thirty-three more mental health beds at DePaul. See
Press Release, La. State Univ. Health Care Servs. Div. of La.'s Hosp. Sys.,
LSU Interim Hospital Opens 20-Bed Acute Detox Unit (Jun. 27, 2007),
www.lsuhospitals.org/media-relations/PressReleases/2007/DetoxUnitOpeningPressRelease.v2.pdf; LSUHCS Release, supra note 110.
113. Adopted as the Louisiana Health Emergency Powers Act. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 29:760-772.
114. Louisiana has adopted a definition of the model law that includes
hurricanes. For example, the statute defines a "public health emergency" as:
[A]n occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition
that is believed to be caused by any of the following: (i) Bioterrorism.
(ii) The appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated
infectious agent or biological toxin. (iii) A disaster, including but not
limited to natural disasters such as hurricane, tornado, storm, flood,
high winds, and other weather related events, forest and marsh fires,
and man-made disasters, including but not limited to nuclear power
plant incidents or nuclear attack, hazardous materials incidents,
accidental release or chemical attack, oil spills, explosion, civil
disturbances, public calamity, hostile military action, and other events
related thereto. (b) Poses a high probability of any of the following
harms: (i) A large number of deaths in the affected population. (ii) A
large number of serious or long-term disabilities in the affected
population. (iii) Widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent
that poses a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large
number of people in the affected population.
Id. § 29:762.
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the New Orleans health care infrastructure would not be able to
withstand a major disaster.
The growing awareness of the weakness of Louisiana's health
care system among state administrators is shown in a program
called "Project Legacy." The Louisiana Office of Mental Health,
yet another agency, was commissioned to create "Project Legacy"
in 2003 to address mental health care issues. A quote from the
report on the project is telling of the effectiveness and the nature of
the project:
Project Legacy is our plan that details the structural and
system improvements identified to begin the transformation
of the Office of Mental Health toward a system of care with
an overarching goal of recovery and resilience. The Office
of Mental Health is taking the first step toward creating the
infrastructure necessary to transform its system of care into
a system that supports emerging technology .... 115
Ambiguous statements such as these are evident throughout
reports pre- and post-Katrina. It is this sort of ambiguous statement
that evidences knowledge of the problem's severity, yet a failure to
implement a concrete plan.
The Louisiana Plan for Access to Mental Health Care, a report
commissioned by Governor Blanco after Hurricane Katrina, is
similarly devoid of substance.16 It is based much more on ends
than on means. The only clear points successfully conveyed are a
desire to shift (and retain) mental health care to the hands of the
proverbial "community" and the recommendation117 of looking at
other mental health care systems across the nation.
Currently, when discussion of the problem with mental health
care in New Orleans arises, the first question that people ask is
why the state does not simply rebuild Charity Hospital. In other
words, many see the problem to have a simple solution-bring
back the facility where the majority of the mentally ill sought care
before the storm. However, this approach overlooks the fact that
the health care system was nearly in shambles before the storm, as
discussed in Part 11.118 Recognizing this fact, many independent
agencies see the fall of Louisiana's mental health care
infrastructure as an opportunity for much-needed change.
115. RoADMAP FOR CHANGE, supra note 29, at 8.
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id.at 79-80
118. Evidence of this fact is the disparity between the LSU and FEMA
estimates for the anticipated cost of rebuilding Charity Hospital. LSU's estimate
is considerably greater because LSU is including repairs that needed to be made
before. See GAO REPORT, supra note 89, at 18-19.
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Specifically, the Public Affairs Research Council (PAR) 1 9 issued
a report, emphasizing its assertion that rebuilding the Charity
System would only bring back what existed before the stormreactive emergency medicine. Instead, there is a clear opportunity
now to move to a more proactive and financially sound system.
PAR proposes keeping only the teaching hospitals in the statewide
LSU system and transferring the other seven charity hospitals to
local control. 12 1 The PAR report also proposes a transition to a
voucher system, which22 would in effect reroute "charity" funding
directly to the patient. 1
Governor Bobby Jindal also sees the breakdown of the health
care infrastructure as a time for change. Jindal recognizes that
Hurricane Katrina brought Louisiana's health care problems to the
forefront. 123 He also recognizes that the first step in preventing
another mental health crisis is to first address the problems
inherent in the system independent of a health care crisis. For this
reason, he plans to create a more efficient health care system by
reducing regulations on health care 1 2 4 and by promoting
"preventative primary care that will improve the health of..,.
citizens . . . and decrease dependence on ... emergency rooms."
12 5
the goal of decreasing dependence on emergency rooms,
Despite
Jindal does plan to rebuild Charity Hospital in New Orleans. 12 6
119. It must be noted that William Jenkins, former LSU System President,
alleges that PAR accepted donations from private health care interests, and is
thus biased. Marsha Shuler, LSU, PAR Debate Report, Group Wants to End
CharityHospitals,THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Mar. 1, 2007, at Al.
120. Bill Stewart, Editorial, Preventive Care Saves Money, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), May 10, 2007, at 6.
121. Jan Moller, Group: Shut Rural Charity Hospitals: Fund Private and
Community Centers, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 7, 2007, at 2. Lake
Charles representatives submitted a resolution to remove W.O. Moss Hospital,
citing the fact that other states have locally controlled hospitals. Letter from
Frederick Cerise, Sec'y, La. Dep't of Health & Hosps., to Sen. Joe McPherson,
Chairman, La. Senate Health & Welfare Comm. (Aug. 20, 2007) (on file with
author). A Roadmap for Change suggests that dividing the states into mental
health districts would make implementing an improved system more
manageable, with the primary goal of "provid[ing] a clear locus of
responsibility," perhaps to combat the ambiguity and confusion of roles found in
statewide administration of health care policy. The major metropolitan areas of
New Orleans and Baton Rouge have already done so. ROADMAP FOR CHANGE,
supra note 29, at 20.
122. Moller, supra note 121, at 2.
123.

BOBBY JINDAL, GOVERNOR OF LA., FRESH START FOR LOUISIANA, HEALTH

CARE REFORM: CREATING A SUSTAINABLE SYSTEM OF QUALITY HEALTHCARE 2

(2007), http://www.bobbyjindal.com/downloads/JindalHealthcare.pdf.
124. Id. at 6.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 10.
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Also, in order to attract more health care professionals to the State,
Jindal plans to decrease medical school tuition. If more students
come to Louisiana for medical training, then more will attend
residency7 in Louisiana and likely remain in Louisiana for their
careers.

However, in implementing this plan, Jindal also should
consider consolidating the mental health agencies in Louisiana and
working with the legislature to provide a more clear delegation of
authority and jurisdiction with regard to the administration of
mental health care. The absence of this was noticed as a problem in
the years before Katrina and was certainly a problem in the
response to Katrina.
VI. PROPOSAL:

A MORE STREAMLINED RESPONSE STATUTE

Aside from streamlining the Louisiana mental health agencies,
the State also needs a streamlined, comprehensive plan in the form
of a statute to prevent such a post-disaster mental health crisis in
the future. This statute must address all the possible health care
problems that, as Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, might emerge
from a natural disaster-a drastic increase in the number of
mentally ill as a result of the psychological stress of the disaster
and the delay in obtaining insurance or health care, as well as a
breakdown in infrastructure. The enactment of such a
comprehensive statute would also assist in remedying the
weaknesses in the Louisiana response that Katrina exposed, such
as overregulation and inconsistent regulation that can lead to
tardiness in action.
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) is
a plausible prototype for such a statute. In fact, Louisiana already
has adopted several provisions of the Model Act in the Louisiana
Emergency Health Powers Act (LEHPA).128 However, the LEHPA
as it currently stands does not sufficiently address Louisiana's
specific mental health care needs. In spite of this shortcoming, the
LEHPA can provide the backbone of a comprehensive health care
emergency act, which would adequately address mental health and
the needs of Louisiana. By supplementing the LEHPA with state
and federal statutes and regulations and by adopting other
provisions of the Model Act, the LEHPA could be broadened to
sufficiently anticipate the obstacles that Katrina showed would
result from a mental health emergency.
127.
128.

Id. at 9.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 29:760-772 (2007).
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The first topic that needs to be addressed within the LEHPA
itself is that it does not specifically address mental health
"outbreak" as a potential manifestation of a "health emergency."
Specifically, in the only substantive provision that refers to mental
health, the LEHPA states that "[d]uring a declaration of a state of
public health emergency, the secretary of the Department of Health
and Hospitals or his designee shall provide information about and
referrals to mental health support personnel to address
psychological responses to the public health emergency."'129 In
other words, the LEHPA only anticipates that the public will
endure stress as a result of an emergency situation, which the
aftermath of Katrina has certainly proved true. However, the
LEHPA does not contemplate that mental illness can be the core of
a public health emergency.
Second, the LEHPA is geared toward addressing a health
emergency resulting from terrorism and biological warfare, rather
than another natural disaster such as Katrina. The MSHEPA
defines a "public health emergency" as "an occurrence or
imminent threat of an illness or health condition that . . . is
believed to be caused by ...bioterrorism ...[or] the appearance
of . . . [a] biological toxin." 130 The MSEHPA leaves natural
disaster as an option for a state to adopt.13 ' While the Louisiana
legislature has tailored the statute to its needs by adopting this
provision and including the natural disaster option,I 2 this is
insufficient in extending the scope of the Act to a mental health
crisis. In order to be considered a public health emergency, the Act
requires that there be "a high probability of ...(i) a large number
of deaths in the affected population; (ii) a large number of serious
or long-term disabilities in the affected population, or (iii)
widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent. .. ,,' 33 These
stipulations seem to coincide more with biological terrorism than
with natural disasters and the mental illness that can result. So, to
more specifically address Louisiana's needs, the provision should
be expanded to state "a large number of serious or long-term
mental or physical disabilities . . . ." This amendment would
address Louisiana's needs by more clearly delineating that mental
illness is intended to fall within the scope of the LEHPA.
129. Id. § 29:764(B)(1) (emphasis added).
130. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 104(m) (Revised Draft
2001), availableat http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf
131. "Natural disaster" is designated as an option by its placement in
brackets. See id.
132. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:762(12)(a)(iii).
133. Id.§ 29:762(12)(b)(i)-(iii).
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Streamlining a mental health care statute in the LEHPA would
also aid in more efficiently anticipating the increase in the number
of mentally ill and the breakdown of infrastructure. Although these
are separate issues, the effect of the increase in mental illness and
the failure of infrastructure after a natural disaster is one in the
same-the inability to care for the mentally ill. As discussed in
Parts III and IV, inefficiencies in Louisiana's response to this
matter can be attributed to short-sightedness of scope in already
existing statutes and bureaucracy. The enactment of a streamlined
statute can address these hurdles by compensating for what the
present emergency statutes lack.
First, while the Stafford Act,' 34 the federal government's
primary tool in responding to emergency situations, recognized
that natural disasters and emergencies can have a grave effect on
mental illness, it did not contemplate the overall breakdown of the
mental health care infrastructure that followed Katrina. Louisiana's
counterpart the Louisiana Homeland Security and Disaster Act
(LHSDA),1B5 has the same shortcomings. The LHEPA does
address such infrastructural issues.' 36 Thus, in supplementing the
Stafford Act and the LHSDA, the LEHPA could serve as guide to
Louisiana in responding to another mental health crisis.
Increasing the scope of the LHEPA would reduce bureaucracy
and overregulation as well. First, the very enactment of a
streamlined health emergency act would centralize statutory
authority in the case that a mental health emergency arises. The
Louisiana Legislature has moved toward this goal by enacting a
provision of the LEHPA that entrusts authority in the governor
who will delegate authority to the DHH as the central agency.
Thus, a clear extension of the LEHPA to mental health
emergencies would extend this benefit of clear delegation to
mental health emergencies. Furthermore, in order to establish the
proposed statute as the sole authority in health emergencies, the
Louisiana Legislature should also adopt the preemption provision
of the MSEHPA. Section 809(b) of the Model Act states, "In the
event of a conflict between this Act and other State or local laws or
regulations concerning public health powers, the provisions of this
Act apply."' 138 This would eliminate any uncertainty as to authority
in an emergency situation. In securing this end, the Louisiana
134.
135.

42 U.S.C. § 5183 (2000).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29:722-741.

136. See generally MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT §
104(m) (Revised Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
137. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29:764-766.
138. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 809(b).
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legislature should also amend the LHEPA to require consolidation
of resources in the event of a mental health emergency. The Model
Act provides that:
The Governor shall appoint a Public Health Emergency
Planning Commission, consisting of the State directors...
of agencies the Governor deems relevant to public health
emergency preparedness . . . [which] shall deliver to the
governor a plan for responding to a public health
emergency, that includes provisions or guidelines . . . for
central coordination of resources, manpower, and services,
including coordination of responses by the state, local,...
139
and federal agencies ....
Aside from infrastructural and administrative issues, the
LHEPA also should be amended to include provisions that would
assist in preventing the insurance problems that arose after Katrina.
First, a comprehensive statute could curtail overregulation with
regard to insurance matters by including standard regulation of
insurance after a disaster. While it is clear that documentation of
treatment is necessary, perhaps if the regulations could have been
anticipated, the acquisition of insurance could have been
expedited. For example, the legislature should consult with the
federal and state CMS to include in the act a standard set of
requirements that would be required in a waiver situation with a
standardized set of forms and procedures, rather than inform state
leaders of requirements as the situations arise. Perhaps this will
give health care providers more time to anticipate and prepare
before the onset of a crisis. Second, the LHEPA should be
amended to address the inconsistencies among state Medicaid
programs after the storm. In fact, some of the several states that
received Louisiana evacuees have recommended "the development
can be implemented
of a national Medicaid Disaster Plan that 140
immediately across multiple state programs."'
VII. CONCLUSION
Overall, the response to the mental health care crisis following
Hurricane Katrina has shown that Louisiana needs to carefully
examine its law with regard to emergency preparedness, as well as
the administration of mental health care as a whole. As mentioned,
recent statistics have demonstrated that the prevalence of mental
and psychological illness has increased drastically since the storm.
139.

Id. §§ 201-202.

140.

SUMMARY OF STATE REPORTS, supra note 42, at 9.

2009]

COMMENTS

689

If Louisiana does not find a way to efficiently care for the mentally
ill, the number will continue to increase. If Louisiana does not
develop a method of efficiently responding to a health emergency,
the same effect will result. Since New Orleans cannot sustain
rebuilding efforts when much of its population is mentally ill,
scrutiny of current policy is crucial to the revitalization of New
Orleans.
HeatherD "Antonio*
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